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I . INTRODUCTION 
   The behavior of Japanese negotiators in the yearly meetings of the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) is difficult for an outsider to understand. Some find it inexplicable that 
Japanese representatives seemed to follow strategy and tactics most likely to produce an 
outcome unsatisfactory to its negotiators, and perhaps to its interests. Japanese 
representatives did not seem to engage in bargaining practices typical of multilateral 
negotiations. Perhaps as a consequence, Japan suffered a stinging defeat at the 46th Session 
held in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, in May 1994. 
   Japan wanted to restore the right of its whalers to take whales on the high seas. Instead, a 
sanctuary for whales in the Southern Ocean received a requisite three-fourths vote, no quota 
was provided for Japanese whalers in the North Pacific, and no special arrangements were 
made for what Japan claimed were highly dependent coastal artisanal whalers. These 
measures were but the latest, and perhaps final, defeats for Japan on the issue. At the next 
(47th) meeting of the IWC, Japan will be confronted with three choices: (1) attempt to alter 
the outcome within the organization (continue to negotiate); (2) take extreme measures and try 
to restore her whaling rights outside of the IWC (defect); or (3) accept defeat.' 
   Since most developed states strongly oppose resumption of whaling, perhaps no clever 
tactics would have fundamentally altered the general outcome. Still, it seems to this observer 
that inappropriate Japanese bargaining behavior contributed to Japan's defeat. Why did Japan 
behave the way she did in the 1980s and 1990s in the IWC negotiations? How can Japanese 
behavior be explained? Perhaps our cumulative social-science knowledge and theories may 
help us understand. Three approaches stand out: 
 1. Rational choice 
   Many analysts of international negotiations still believe that agents of a collectivity 
choose goals (preferences) calculated to maximize the interests they represent, assess the 
alternatives and the consequences that would flow from each alternative and choose tactics 
most likely to produce an optimal realization of their goals.2 In the bargaining arena they 
make offers, issue threats and attempt to reach agreement with other parties that are "Pareto 
optimal" (where they can be made better off while those on the other side are made no worse
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off). If, despite their best tactical efforts, they cannot arrange an outcome better than the 
status-quo-ante, they opt out of the negotiation, since their best alternative is the status quo.3 
Can Japan's participation in the IWC be explained by such a conceptual framework ? 
 2. Cultural Molding - "The Japanese Way" 
   Whatever its merits, a pure rational-choice approach has its limitations. It cannot explain 
the outcomes in many important negotiations. In fact, some critics charge, such models, 
however useful they are prescriptively, are not very useful descriptively in assessing the outcome 
of most "real world" negotiations.4 They claim that to understand how real people behave in a 
negotiating setting, one must assess how their personalities and cultures contribute to their 
behavior. In dealing with Japan and the IWC, we will put aside the question of personality,5 
but will look at the input of culture and values in helping to mold Japanese behavior. While 
all negotiators reflect their cultural roots, some scholars have asserted that Japanese 
bargaining behavior is especially distinctive and culture driven.6 One scholar who has looked 
carefully at Japanese bargaining behavior in multilateral negotiating settings, albeit before the 
Second World War, saw a pattern of behavior that was based upon "deeply rooted cultural 
habits."7 Similar "cultural habits" appeared in the IWC negotiations as we shall see. But is 
culture a necessary and sufficient explanation of the outcome?8 
  3. Constraints on the Negotiators 
   Recently, a number of scholars have emphasized the importance of structure in the 
outcome of public, especially international, decisions.This school of thought emphasizes the 
pattern of constraints under which a diplomat must operate, and how they influence behavior. 
Major constraints are caused by the structure of the domestic system which he/she represents. 
Thus, Japanese negotiators in the IWC were influenced by constraints imposed by their 
bureaucratically dominated-political system. Perhaps we should look to "bureaucratic politics" 
to explain why inappropriate tactics were used in the IWC.9 Japan's delegates were simply not 
free to choose what might have worked best. 
    More recently, international bargaining has been conceptualized as a two-level game.10 In 
this framework, the negotiator bargains at two levels - domestic and international - and the 
output of the former heavily impacts the latter. Bargaining at the domestic level narrows the 
"win-set" at the international level because the foreign policy negotiator must always be 
concerned with the necessity of ratifying (in the broadest sense, accepting and implementing 
the outcome, not just legal ratification) a joint or international decision at the domestic level. 
The domestic level includes more than the interplay in the bureaucracy while a negotiator's 
instructions are being devised. It may also include the direct participation at the international 
level of transgovernmental connections (a faction of one government interacting directly with 
a faction of another government), transnational connections (the public of one state acting in 
concert with the public of another), and cross-level connections (a government official from 
one government interacting directly with the public of another state)." 
    This paper will explore all three of these theories of foreign policy decision-making and 
their links with international bargaining, and will attempt to apply them to Japan's efforts to
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find an acceptable solution to the problem of whaling in the late 20th century. First, the 
nature of the substantive bargaining problem will be explicated. Japan's bargaining response 
to these problems in the IWC will then be explored. The three theories will then be examined 
and "fitted" to the actual bargaining patterns found. Finally, we will assess the usefulness of 
these methods to understanding Japan's bargaining behavior at the IWC, Japan's bargaining 
in general, as well as negotiation theory. 
   I should note that I believe that Japan's diplomatic failure in the IWC matters beyond 
being a test-bed for international relations theorizing. First, the issue matters to Japan, which 
has been isolated on this issue. Its values have been attacked, and it must find a way of 
dealing with the issue because it is important to a sense of self-worth and place in the world. 
Second, the issue matters to us all as we contemplate the rapidly evolving post-Cold War 
international system and the role that Japan will be expected to play, particularly through 
multilateral fora. Were the results of Japan's efforts an anomaly and therefore likely to be 
restricted to this special issue, or does it tell us something about Japan's ability to play a 
major role in the bargaining necessary to achieve a stable world system? Third, the problem 
matters to those interested resolving international problems with a high emotional and 
ideological content. Is what happened in the last 10 years of IWC negotiations an example of 
an international politics with a high symbolic content in which little or no tolerance was 
shown to "reasonable" proposals that violated a new "ethic" ...and might this be repeated in 
other fora? Fourth, the issue matters to those concerned with the environment. In some 
respect the attempt to end whaling raised critical questions about the nature of sustainability, 
a principle of environmental management enshrined in The Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, 
laboriously worked out in 1992 at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development as 
the appropriate standard for environmental management. 12 
][ . The Problem: Japan in the International Whaling Commission 
A. How we got to where we are 
   The history of whaling is a record of extraordinarily rapacious behavior. Little concern 
was shown for the survival of the world's largest mammals. European and American whalers 
from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries hunted one species after another to the point of 
extinction, usually switching to smaller species when the larger animals were so decimated 
that hunting them was no longer commercially viable. Whalers of bowhead, sperm, humpback 
and gray whales targeted large slow animals that usually floated when killed.13 Whale oil was 
the major source of lighting fuel before Colonel Edwin Drake discovered oil in Pennsylvania 
in 1859. Demand was high. In addition, whales were commercially valuable in the gilded age 
for their baleen, which were turned into stays in women's corsets. Whales were a source of 
wealth. They were common property resources, available to any claimant with the capability 
to hunt them in the oceans of the world. 
   Japan joined the high seas hunt after the Meiji Restoration removed the prohibition on 
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leaving the islands of Japan (1868). Japanese whalers were mostly interested in hunting 
whales for food. (One of the principal reasons for the "opening" of Japan by Commodore 
Perry and his "Black Fleet" was Japanese authorities' treatment of stranded American 
whalers). 14 
   Millennia before the major states of the world developed distant-water whaling fleets, 
peoples in many areas of the world used whales and other cetaceans for food. Often these were 
communities of "aboriginal" peoples, especially the Inuit people of the Far North in Canada, 
Greenland, Russia, and the United States. Even in cases where these fisherfolk did not fit the 
aboriginal label, e.g. in the Faroes Islands, northern Norway, Iceland, Japan, and some 
Caribbean Islands such as St. Vincent and the Grenadines, they were artisanal or small-type 
exploiters. 15 They usually live in remote locations, and even today operate with modest 
catches and have rarely overexploited cetaceans.16 Whaling is not merely a significant 
contribution to their livelihood, it is integral to their culture.l7 The right of Inuit whalers to 
continue to take whales, although often under attack, 18 is protected under the IWC treaty. 
Small-type whalers have no such protection. 
   Whaling needed little regulation when the technical capabilities of the whalers was low. 
The hunter's desire to take every animal spotted was counterbalanced by limits in hunting and 
navigation equipment, vessel speed, and ability to process animals into useful products. But 
that changed with the advent of steam-powered vessels and the 1886 invention by Sven Foyn 
of Norway of an explosive grenade harpoon fired from a cannon mounted on a fast catcher 
vessel. When floating factory ships were developed, shore processing stations were no longer 
needed for hunting in remote regions. As Dr. Ray Gambell, IWC Secretary, noted, this made 
fast swimming species such as the blue, fin, and sei targets for the whalers and helped spread 
the hunt into the Antarctic.19 It was inevitable that by the 1930s serious overharvesting would 
occur, so serious that the concerned states were willing to enter into an international 
convention to regulate whaling. 
   The first "modern" effort at managing whales was found in a 1931 Convention. As with 
many early attempts to manage common property resources, the interested parties tried to 
regulate the taking of whales without trying to solve the open entry problem. That is, a 
number of parties had little incentive to cooperate in not overexploiting a resource if one or 
more present or new fisherman could come in and take whatever they pleased. Those who 
would accept restrictions while others did not were "suckers." For example, Japan, which 
began whaling in Antarctica in 1934, refused to adhere to the 1931 (and successor 1937) 
conventions. This made the signatories "suckers" and Japan (and Germany) "free-riders." 
Japanese whaling was at its prewar peak in 1941, with 2,972 crewman employed on six 
factory ships and 45 catcher vessels.20The signatories used a "species" approach restricting 
hunting to baleen whales only. It also regulated by other "biological" standards. The 
Convention established "seasons" and exempted the taking of females accompanied by calves 
or other immature whales, and established size limits for some of the whales to be taken. It 
required the collection of statistics so that regulation could be put on a more "scientific" 
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basis. The signatories tried to use an international convention to solve not so much an 
overharvesting, but an overproduction problem. Clearly, industry managers were the 
predominant drivers of attempts to regulate whaling during the 1930's.21 Little or no 
international infrastructure was created to administer the necessary rules. 
   The 1931 Agreement proved inadequate to the task of managing whaling. It was extended 
by a 1937 agreement signed by nine whaling states (including the previously non-cooperating 
Germany) that: (1) prohibited taking of right and gray whales; (2) set size limits for blue, 
humpback and sperm whales; (3) restricted the Antarctic season to three months; (4) closed 
factory ship operations in most of the world oceans north of 40° South latitude; and (5) tried 
its hand at enforcement by asking each signatory to place a government inspector on whaling 
vessels flying its flag. It used similar management devices as its predecessor to manage 
whaling. These measures were supplemented by a Protocol signed in 1938 that banned the 
taking of humpback whales, and created a whale sanctuary in the Pacific sector of Antarctic 
waters. 
   Although a significant portion of the major whaling fleets was sunk during World War II, 
the resumption of whaling was anticipated in a 1944 Agreement promoted by the Whaling 
Committee of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. An overall quota - a 
measure that had eluded earlier negotiators - was worked out at approximately two-thirds of 
the prewar catch. However, it was to be measured in a new unit, the notorious "Blue Whale 
Unit" (BWU). Since most whalers from Allied states were still interested in whale oil and the 
largest whales produced the most oil, the total catch quota was measured in "blue whale" 
equivalents. That is, one blue whale equalled 2 fin or 2.5 humpbacks, or 6 sei whales. The 
impact should have been predictable every whaling nation rushed to take as much of the 
BWUs as they could. There was soon more competition from Japan, which was interested 
mostly in providing scarce protein to feed its war-ravaged population. Over objections of 
other states, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers allowed Japan to resume 
Antarctic whaling on a "temporary" basis in 1946-47. Japan returned to Antarctic whaling in 
full force. By 1965 Japanese whalers were taking nearly 27,000 whales a year. Until 1963, the 
Japanese consumed more whale meat than any other type of meat.22 Russia was also a major 
whaling state after World War II for largely the same reasons as Japan - whales were high-
quality protein and the cost, compared with the equivalent protein from land sources, was low. 
To this day we do not know how many whales Russian whalers took before they dropped out 
of pelagic whaling. The numbers are likely to be very large, but during the monopoly of 
power of the Communist Party over the Soviet Union, the totals were deliberately under-
reported to the IWC.23 
   The International Whaling Commission was established in 1946. It has not enjoyed a 
reputation as an effective organization, either in terms of its own stated goal of insuring "an 
optimal level of whale stocks,"24 or in terms of other "nonconsumptive" goals such as 
preservation of the great whales. Indeed, "it seems that the whole history of the IWC has 
filled whale scientists and conservationists with despair."25 Often it is characterized as having 
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been established too late to prevent the decline of the larger species, often using inappropriate 
standards for its conservation measures (e.g. "Blue Whale Units"), or merely being the captive 
of the whaling states because of its constitutional defects. Until the 1980s, it seemed 
powerless to stop the overharvesting of the major stocks of great whales. Critics concede that 
the situation got somewhat better after a "new management procedure" was put in place 
(1975), and some of those critics. were even more favorable to the organization after a 
moratorium was put in place (1982).26 But on the whole the IWC has been a weak and 
relatively ineffective organization throughout its history. A research group of Norwegian and 
American analysts, dividing its history into three phases, judged that in the first phase (1946 
to mid-60's), effectiveness of the organization was low, in the middle phase (mid-1960's to the 
end of the 1970's ), it was medium as a result of the new management procedure, and in the 
most recent phase (mid-1970's-1991), it was low again.27 Since most of the analysts are 
citizens of states at interest, their conclusions are open to question. Nevertheless, they tried to 
make their judgments based upon specific criteria that measured "integrative potential," and 
therefore their judgment should not be dismissed out of hand. 
   The tasks assigned to the IWC were difficult to accomplish on both technical and 
political grounds. Scientifically valid data to conduct management were unavailable. 
Moreover, the foxes had to be set to guard the henhouse. No one else was available. The 
highly competitive stakeholders were trying to engender voluntary cooperation among 
themselves in a situation where they hoped they could continue whaling and not reduce their 
take below the catch tonnage considered economically viable for their fleets. Each hoped the 
other "fox" could be induced to reduce its take. Usually what occurred was that each did 
reduce take, but not enough to restore the stocks to some notion of an "appropriate" level 
since no one wanted to be a "sucker." The IWC was never empowered (except negatively 
through the moratorium, closing areas, etc.) to allocate the resource and reduce the hunter's 
incentive to take every animal encountered. The IWC could not make an authoritative 
determination that State A's hunters had the right to take X animals and State B's hunters had 
the right to Y animals. In short, the IWC had serious constitutional defects. 
   The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) was negotiated in 
Washington in 1946. The United States, the major developed state physically intact after 
World War II, was just beginning to recognize its responsibilities for postwar leadership and 
its obligation to assist the reconstruction of its devastated friends and former foes. While the 
USA was still a whaling state, the age of the Yankee Whaler was over. Before too long it 
would be a nonwhaling state, as would many of the other former major European whaling 
states. Nevertheless, the ICRW was negotiated by most of its parties to protect their whaling 
interests. Their status changed over the years, and much of the evolution of IWC policy can 
be explained by the fact that many of the major players no longer had any, or very limited, 
commercial whaling interests to protect. 
   ICRW was constructed along the lines of earlier attempts at whaling regulation. The 
purpose of the agreement was to "ensure proper and effective conservation and development 
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of whale stocks" and "thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry."28 
To that end, the Convention established the IWC. The Commission was composed of one 
member from each of the contracting parties. Each contracting party had one vote. Decisions 
were to be taken by simple majority of members voting, but important substantive decisions 
required a positive three-fourths majority.29 
   Member states could "defect:" if a state notified the Commission that it objected to a 
policy decision (technically an amendment to the schedule), that policy decision would not be 
effective with respect to that government unless or until it withdrew the objection.30 Member 
states also could issue permits to conduct scientific whaling, allow the whalers to "process" or 
use commercially the whales taken as long as the scientific data derived was transmitted to an 
international data archive.31 Compliance with the agreement was self-enforcing. Each 
contracting government was supposed to ensure the application of the treaty to its citizens.32 
The Commission was authorized to create a secretariat (which was always kept small) and 
establish subordinate bodies (most importantly a Technical Committee and Scientific 
Committee). The Commission was authorized to perform studies and collect statistical data.33 
It was also expected to cooperate with member governments and international agencies. 
   The major policy tool of the IWC is found in an attached document, a "schedule" through 
which the Commission could regulate whaling, among other measures, by specifying: (1) 
protected and unprotected species; (2) open and closed seasons; (3) open and closed waters 
(including sanctuaries); (4) size limits for each species; (5) time, methods, and intensity of 
whaling; and (6) gear restrictions.34 These measures were to be employed "for the 
conservation, development and optimal utilization of whale resources" and are supposed to be 
based on scientific findings.35 While the Commission could ban all whaling in closed waters, 
the agreement did not give the Commission the right to restrict the number or nationality of 
factory ships or allocate specific quotas.36 Its ability to limit entry was constrained. It could 
not allocate or determine who should get what. Like five of the eight fisheries commissions 
created after World War II, it could not divide the catch and eliminate the incentive for a 
whaling company (and its sponsoring state) to take as much of an overall quota as possible.31 
   During its early years, the dominant influence on the IWC was industry managers who 
affected the national policy of the whaling states and often participated in the IWC Technical 
Committee as representatives or observers.38 The yearly catch limit (16,000 BWUs) 
established by the IWC, while lower than the overall yearly prewar catch (30,000 BWUs) was 
woefully inadequate for maintaining many species and stocks at a sustainable level. The 
whalers were engaging in what IWC Secretary Gambell called a "whaling Olympics."39 While 
the postwar limits were set after study by cetologists, the state of the science was such that 
they were largely guessing at what might be a sustainable or prudent yield. 
   In 1961 a new attempt was made to put whaling management on a more scientific basis. A 
committee of three (later four) population dynamicists was formed to assess baleen whale 
stocks using more mathematically sophisticated tools than available earlier.40 They 
recommended drastic reductions in take. These recommendations were resisted by the active
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whaling states until 1965, and even then the whalers were given three years to adjust their 
catch downward to below the sustainable yield. Blue Whale Units were not eliminated until 
1972, and observers reporting to the Commission were not authorized until 1972. 
   The difficulties in gaining consensus among whalers, their state protectors, cetologists 
and the increasingly assertive conservationists, preservationists and animal-rights activists did 
not go unnoticed. In 1972 a resolution of the Stockholm Conference on the Human 
Environment called for a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling, partially in response to 
the inability of the IWC to manage in a sustainable manner.41 In 1974 the IWC responded 
with a "New Management Procedure" that went into effect in 1975. It purported to reorient 
management with a different conceptual approach. Management of whaling was to be on the 
basis of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY).42 In theory, if the original stock size could be 
calculated, it should be possible to take whales when they are at 50-60% of their original 
abundance. This rate of predation should be sustainable over time, presuming the stocks to be 
exploited can be brought back to the acceptable percentage of their original numbers. Stocks 
that fall 10% below MSY were to be exempt from exploitation and treated as Protection Stocks. 
Stocks at 10-20% above MSY could be exploited, but not heavily so they too could recover. 
They were to be treated as Sustained Management Stocks. Stocks more than 20% above MSY 
were viewed sufficiently abundant to be taken at a higher rate. They were to be treated as 
Initial Management Stocks. 
   Unfortunately, the scheme proved unworkable. Data were difficult to acquire. The method 
was probably flawed scientifically, and it did not take the economics of the industry into 
account. The evident failings of the MSY scheme finally induced 25 of 32 members of the 
IWC at its 1982 meeting to vote a long-proposed indefinite moratorium on commercial 
whaling. During the period that the quota was reduced to zero, the Scientific Committee 
embarked upon a comprehensive assessment of whale stocks and the development of a new 
management procedure to replace maximum sustainable yield. It was arduous work, and there 
was little consensus within the concerned community of scientists. Indeed, after much study, 
five different schemes were proposed. The third on the list, or C Procedure,43 was finally 
recommended for implementation as a key component of the Revised Management Procedure 
(RMP) by the Scientific Committee at the 1990 IWC meeting. But it was turned back in the 
Spring 1991 plenary session in favor of the maintenance of the commercial moratorium. 
Strenuous efforts were made to adopt the Revised Management Procedure in the subsequent 
three (44th through 46th) meetings of the IWC, but they were all turned back in favor of the 
maintenance of the moratorium, and in the last session, a Southern Ocean Sanctuary was 
created. In response, Iceland gave notice of its withdrawal from the Commission in 1991, 
withdrew in 1992, and announced it wanted to set up a regional marine mammal commission 
for the North Atlantic.44 The Commission reached a crisis. 
   Although deeply disturbed by the trends, Japan has not exercised her right to withdraw 
from the organization, but Kazuo Shima, Japan's commissioner, indicated that such a move is 
now under consideration.45 At first, Japan indicated that it would not accept the moratorium, 
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and entered an objection. But Japan withdrew its objection under heavy pressure from the 
United States. In the 1980s and 1990s Japan had a major dilemma in deciding upon a strategy 
for dealing with the problem of restoring a right to whaling that would be recognized by the 
world community. It could drop out as Iceland did, and act unilaterally or in concert with 
like-minded states, but (as I will show below) there are important negative incentives. Japan 
also could "opt out." But it tried that and could not stand the diplomatic pressure. It was 
reduced to two lines of conduct. First, it could stay in the organization, help reform its 
weaknesses, and expect that "reasonable" delegates from other states would then accept the 
lifting of the total moratorium. Second, it could pursue limited "workarounds" or mitigating 
efforts to a total ban on whaling. Three "mitigations" included avoidance, exceptions, and 
substitution. In fact, Japan pursued all courses of action simultaneously. 
   Avoidance of the impact of a total ban was possible by purchasing whale meat that was 
either caught legally in a nonsignatory country's waters or was "poached" by "pirate" whaling 
vessels such as the Sierra. Japan has been accused of such conduct.46 Exceptions to the total 
ban were also possible under the Whaling Commission Convention. The United States has 
successfully requested a quota of bowhead whales for Alaskan Inuit whaling villages.47 Japan 
has requested and been refused a permit which would have authorized "small type coastal 
whaling."48 A more controversial form of exception is the provision in the ICRW that allows 
"scientific whaling ." Iceland, Norway, and Japan have exercised their rights under that 
provision. All are under vehement attack from anti-whaling forces. As Greenpeace put it, 
"scientific whaling is almost universally regarded as nothing more than commercial whaling 
under a different name."49 While meat of the whales killed has been sold commercially to help 
pay expenses of the expeditions, Japan denies that scientific whaling expeditions even 
recover their costs.50 Moreover, they state that high-quality investigatory work has been done 
to support the effort to put a new management plan on scientific basis.51 Finally, it has been 
possible to partially substitute high-seas whaling for whaling within a state's 200 mile 
economic zone with permission and possibly participation of the coastal state. It is also 
possible to shift the fishing effort to other gear, such as drift nets,52 or to other species such 
as small cetaceans. 
B. Why We Are Where We Are Today 
   The IWC's agenda at yearly meetings is notable for continuity of issues. But there are 
certain key points where a jump shift has taken place. Such a jump shift took place with the 
adoption of the moratorium in 1982. From that time forth, the IWC has been a very different 
bargaining arena than previously. Did Japan's representatives see and understand the radical 
nature of the shift? 
   The most obvious change was a shift in the working majority. A majority of new and 
existing IWC member states formed to oppose the resumption of commercial whaling - a 
powerful coalition that can command the votes of three-quarters of the delegations on 
important issues. At times, its opponents complained that the majority was packed or padded 
by the votes of half a dozen small states who were "bought off" by anti-whaling governments 
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or nongovernment organizations. 53 (For example, rumor had it that a small Caribbean state 
that adopted an anti-whaling stance at the 46th Meeting in Puerto Vallarta paid off its arrears 
in membership dues with a suitcase full of cash in order to have its voting rights restored. 
Where they got the cash is officially still unknown. But even if true, their vote did not tip the 
scales at the meeting.) The coalition is large, united, and is likely to be sufficiently stable 
over the long run to hold together. Perhaps effective bargaining pressure could force it to 
make incremental changes in its positions, but it is unlikely that the basic commitment of its 
core members - to end commercial whaling - can be reversed. 
   Why did an anti-whaling coalition form? One clear answer is because the interests of 
most of the major states of the world have shifted. They no longer participate in whaling; they 
no longer expect whaling to be an important, or even measurable, contribution to their 
economic well-being; therefore they have no domestic reason to foster whaling. In fact, the 
economic argument for them has shifted to the nonconsumption side. Many have whale-
watching industries that gross million of dollars. They have an incentive to keep whales alive 
in the wild. 
   The consequences of most developed states' disinterest and disapproval in retaining a 
right to whale have been critically important to Japan. Whatever goodwill Japan has created 
in relationships with other states does not carry over to the whaling issue. With no major pro-
whaling interest groups or pressure groups to make a two-or multilevel game within these 
countries competitive, the foreign offices of the major developed states have no incentive to 
try to resist the ardent push of the anti-whaling forces for instructions that would call for the 
elimination of commercial whaling.54 The cynical might consider the whaling issue a 
"throwaway" issue for most developed governments . That is, whatever analytical or scientific 
understanding of the whaling issue developed-state government officials might have 
personally, they can throw it away and concede to the anti-whaling animal-rights segment of 
the strong environmental forces that have arisen in recent years. They won't lose political 
capital. They do not have to worry about enormous financial capital outlays to do something 
about the problem, as they must for global change, acid rain, or other transboundary problems. 
    Not only have interests changed in most developed states, but so have the perceptions of 
their citizens. Environmental awareness has become a major concern of public life. Driving 
this changed set of perceptions are many ardent, committed direct-action environmental 
groups. On issues they deem salient, they are adamant and intolerant. They lobby to change 
the positions of governments on both domestic and international policies. They do not trust 
governments, or governments alone to "do the right thing," and take direct action with their 
own governments, nongovernmental organizations, other governments, corporations, and 
individual citizens of other states. They operate on a transnational basis, and some even have 
a small presence in Japan.55 
    Whaling is a favored issue of such groups. To them, the very idea of "consuming" an 
"intelligent"56 creature is considered not merely poor resource management policy but morally 
repugnant. As one anti-whaling leader put it, "as a matter of principle, we are deeply opposed 
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to commercial whaling and believe it is no longer justifiable. We believe the time has come 
for the IWC, serving the will and conscience of the international community, to recognize that 
the killing for profit of the global resource of whales is no longer acceptable in evolving 
world public opinion."57 They view themselves as moral arbiters58 and are willing to take 
virtually any action to reach their goal - including direct participation in the meetings of the 
IWC, issuing anti-whaling statements whatever their technical or scientific veracity in all 
possible fora, blocking whaling vessels in port and on the hunt, and various other acts of 
"guerrilla theater ." It has gotten to the point where Japan, Iceland, and Norway refuse to 
provide information to the IWC about the registration of whaling vessels "following acts of 
terrorism directed against whaling vessels."59 
   At the least, these groups have become a serious impediment to the orderly conduct of 
business at IWC meetings. At worst, they have poisoned the atmosphere of the meetings, 
making any serious negotiations virtually impossible because of their physical harassment 
(such as spitting or pouring blood upon) delegates from states defending whaling. At the 1990 
meeting of the IWC, only 29 states with voting rights were represented, while representatives 
of 68 nongovernmental organizations wandered the meeting hall floor, committee rooms, and 
delegation lounges.60 We could debate whether these groups are "Arcadian 
environmentalists"61 or millenarians, 62 but the indisputable fact is their presence in the 
whaling question is felt strongly and directly. 
C. The Real Bargaining Game Being Played Today in the IWC 
   There should be no illusion over the real "game" being played today in the IWC. The 
majority wishes to end whaling, certainly commercial whaling. It expects to accomplish this by 
preventing reform of past whaling practices and the implementation of the Revised 
Management Procedure. Without these reforms, the moratorium cannot be lifted. Its tactics 
include delay, forcing the commitment of time and effort to side issues and the proposal of an 
alternative scheme (the Revised Management Scheme). 
   Delay is a very effective tactic. Opponents of whaling are well aware of how small are the 
remnants of commercial whaling fleets in Japan Iceland, and Norway, the only three states 
expressing a wish to continue "commercial" whaling. In Japan, there are very few high-seas 
catcher boats, and many of the whalers, especially skilled harpooners, are now past middle 
age. Economically, whaling as a potential commercial enterprise is very questionable without 
government subsidies in the form of expensive fisheries research and monitoring programs 
required under the terms of the RMP. The whaling fleet in Norway is stronger because it is 
active, and it may be profitable, but its catching efforts are confined to a localized region.63 
The anti-whalers hope that with delay, the enterprises will go bankrupt, the whalers get too 
old to put to sea, and the vessels and equipment rot at the pier. After tying up the effort at 
reform for years they hope that no "rational" government will view whaling as having 
sufficient economic promise to be worth reviving. 
    There are many ways to delay action in the IWC, and oponents of the resumption of 
whaling seem to have found most of them. Nothing that has been done to implement the 
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Revised Management Procedure is good enough. Consequently, no reform provisions have 
been put to a vote, and as long as there is a possibility that commercial whaling might 
resume, none will be. A Revised Management "Scheme" must be developed and perfected 
before the Revised Management Procedure can be put to a vote. Recommendations of the 
Scientific Committee are ignored. Norway's proposal to create an inspection and observation 
program required under the "Scheme" is not put to a vote because it is "a useful starting point. 
 but not nearly comprehensive enough."64 The effect of the moratorium on whale stocks must 
be tested before the moratorium is lifted. The impact of global warming must be tested on the 
whale stocks, etc.65 And so the game goes on - the algorithm to underly a new quota must be 
"tested" and "fine -tuned" before it can be implemented . 
   The question of humane killing is a perfect diversionary issue. No one who claims to be 
civilized could object to considering ways to reduce the suffering of a fellow mammal. It is a 
real issue, but it allows for endless hours to be spent on obfuscation. When Japan raised the 
question of humane killing of all wild animals and not just whales, its pleas to widen the 
discussion so that the "moral" values of all states and not just Japan would be debated were 
swept away. Workshops and discussions on this issue consumed virtually whole annual 
meetings, such as the 44th Session. Expanding the agenda to other related but not directly 
relevant issues such as small cetaceans was another successful diversionary tactic. 
   While many of the opponents justify their tactics as appropriate to the moral obligation to 
end the immoral practice of whaling, they border on cultural imperialism, racism, and Japan 
"bashing." Tolerance of any other way of life, any other sets of beliefs that could include use 
of whales is so repugnant that any tactic is justified. Anything to embarrass the opponent is 
permissible. The IWC sessions in recent years are tactically brutal, and any assessment of 
bargaining in this arena must take this into account. 
D. The Ostensible Bargaining Game - Implementation of the Revised Management Plan 
   In the last several annual meetings of the IWC, delegations have gone through the 
motions of dealing with the key issue on the agenda - developing those measures and plans 
that would allow for the implementation of the Revised Management Plan. As noted, the real 
plan is that by going through the motions, the opponents of implementation hope to kill any 
changes in the management system for whales that would allow the resumption of whaling. 
Going through the motions means ignoring or denegrating any real work that might provide 
ammunition to pro-whaling forces. This includes scientific advice. As a result, Dr. Phillip 
Hammond, chair of the Scientific Committee, resigned in disgust when the unanimous 
recommendation of the Scientific Committee was ignored.66 
   Reform measures are on the agenda, and they have to be duly considered. The algorithm 
for determining sustainability had to be reduced from 15 rival proposals to one. The Revised 
Management Procedure was seemingly moved forward. But it had to be tested: that was added 
to the agenda. However, in the 44th meeting, the Australian delegation introduced the idea 
that a New Management "Scheme" must be considered and implemented before the New 
Management Procedure be voted upon.67 All aspects of the Scheme, such as inspections, had
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to be settled before action on the Plan could be considered. By the 46th meeting all aspects 
had still not been considered and therefore the Procedure could not be implemented.68 Since 
every detail has not been settled the moratorium cannot be lifted. 
   In the meantime, since Japan and Norway have pressed the issue of reform and as 
technical issue after technical issue is settled, delay may not work forever. In the last three 
sessions, the anti-whaling forces have turned in a different direction to end commercial 
whaling in at least one of the most important whale regions of the world - the Southern 
Ocean. At the 44th meeting, France introduced the idea of creating a whaling sanctuary in the 
Southern Ocean.69 Naturally, within a sanctuary all whaling would be banned. Its effects 
would be reviewed every ten years. In its original formulation it would cover 13 million 
square miles and reach up to 40 degrees south latitude. The item was referred for study and 
recommendations to a workshop to be held on Norfolk Island. This measure would make the 
end of the moratorium virtually meaningless. 
   The experts gathered at Norfolk Island recommended that the idea receive more study. 
But that did not stop sanctuary supporters. Since the expert group did not say the sanctuary 
was an unacceptable idea, they pressed for a vote on the issue. 
   Supporters had to work to gain a three-quarters majority. The original geographic 
boundaries of the sanctuary overlapped the 200 Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of 
Argentina and Chile. While there is no scientific justification for excluding Argentina's and 
Chile's EEZs, in order to gain the requisite majority, there was sufficient political 
justification. Therefore supporters proposed that the sanctuary's boundary dip below the 
economic zones of the two Latin American states.70 Japan, Norway, and several Caribbean 
states tried to remove from the sanctuary protection the only whale species that was likely to 
be exploited in the foreseeable future - the minke whale - but that effort failed .71 The 
sanctuary proposal was put to the vote and passed with 23 yeas, 1 nay, and 5 abstentions. 
Japan, of course, was the one negative vote.. Even Norway abandoned Japan, absenting itself 
from the vote rather than abstaining, so that it would not have to put itself on record.72 
   Japan suffered other humiliating blows. A long-term effort had been put forth to provide 
relief for four small Japanese coastal communities by recognzing a special status for small-
type coastal whaling. While Japan's arguments were convincing to an impressive cadre of 
social scientists,73 they fell largely on deaf ears in the IWC debates. One objection was that, 
while small-type coastal whaling may be small, it is still commercial and someone is making a 
profit from the killing of intelligent creatures. To counter this argument, Japan developed a 
new action plan for community-based whaling (CBW). The distribution of whale meat would 
be arranged by local governments on a cost-recovery basis and the profit removed from 
distribution .74 But these arrangements also were turned down. 
E. Japan's Dilemma 
   Japan suffered a complete diplomatic defeat at the 46th meeting of the IWC. It is difficult 
to see how the situation could be worse. The moratorium remains in place, with new obstacles 
constantly being placed in the way of reforms that would allow the Revised Management Plan 
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to be implemented. A sanctuary has been created in the Southern Ocean. Japan received no 
interim North Pacific quotas. Japan's plan for community-based whaling is not likely to be 
taken seriously, and no relief is in sight for small-type coastal whalers. Japan's scientific 
whaling, which includes lethal methods, is viewed as a disguised commercial operation and is 
subject to constant diplomatic harassment by opposing governments and from Greenpeace in 
the field. Japan has few and not very powerful friends on the whaling issue. 
   All Japan's alternatives involve significant costs. To succeed, Japan would have to 
induce most of the major developed states to alter their positions, notably Australia, France, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and especially the United States. Turning the United 
States around is particularly important since the U.S has been the principal enforcer of 
whaling and other international environmental regimes, such as the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES). 
   Domestic law requires that the U.S. use its domestic jurisdiction to impose punishments 
upon states violating what the U.S. claims are their obligations under international 
environmental treaties. An amendment, the so-called Packwood Amendment to the basic U.S. 
fisheries law (the Magnuson Act) requires that an offending state lose its right to fish in the 
U.S. 200-mile EEZ. Another amendment - the Pelly Amendment - forces U.S. authorities 
to deny an offending state the right to export seafood to the United States. The Packwood 
Amendment is no current threat since, for other reasons, all foreign fishing in the U.S. 200-
mile EEZ has been terminated. But the Pelly Amendment is a serious deterrent, since there is 
a multi-million dollar trade between the United States and Japan in fisheries products. But 
beyond the specific dollars involved, a serious effort to enforce the Pelly Amendment could 
well trigger a trade war. There are already so many unresolved trade issues between the 
United States and Japan that all concerned with harmonization of relations between the two 
countries feel very uncomfortable.75 Whaling could add a nasty element of cultural 
misunderstanding, aid "Japan-bashers," entangle Japan and the United States in General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) proceedings and escalate mistrust to a point where 
U.S.-Japan relations will be even more difficult to untangle than they are at present. 
Moreover, enforcement of penalties against states that defy what the environmental 
community perceives as their environmental treaty obligations has been quite popular with a 
substantial proportion of the U.S. Congress. Often senior officials on both sides hope to avoid 
making the situation worse by enforcing the Pelly Amendment, but whenever a U.S. 
administration tries to avoid or delay certification of a state, environmentalists sue in the 
courts to ensure enforcement. 
1. Fitting the theory to the behavior 
A. Japan's Bargaining Behavior in the IWC 
   Individuals and groups who interact with each other develop predictable patterns of 
behavior. The following attributes of Japan's interactions with others in the IWC seem to be 
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characteristic of Japan's approach to protecting her whaling interests within the IWC: 
 1. Moderation or Reasonableness 
   Given the original premise upon which Japan's position is based, the positions that Japan 
espoused at the IWC were moderate and reasonable. Consequently, Japan felt there was 
nothing to negotiate. Japan's stance was not a negotiating stance but a problem-solving 
stance. 
   If the underlying problem in the IWC was failure to prevent the overharvesting of whales 
because of flawed procedures, then the task at hand was to reform those procedures so that the 
hunt could be put on a sustainable basis. This was the heart of Japan's position. Japanese 
negotiators worked on and cooperated with others on the necessary research to develop 
criteria for a Revised Management Procedure. They also were willing to develop humane 
killing methods and declare various whale species as Sustained Management Stocks and as 
Protection Stocks, to be even more stringently regulated.76 
   Japan was even willing to use the sanctuary idea, as long as it did not include a very 
abundant species that research showed could sustain a limited take. Since sufficient progress 
had been made on these issues for confidence that, in the foreseeable future the "Whaling 
Olympics" would not recur, Japan demanded the restoration of her whaling rights in respect to 
robust stocks of non-endangered whale species. Even in specific demands, Japan was 
moderate. Since the 1982 moratorium, researchers estimated 760,000 minke whales in the 
Southern Ocean. A take of 2000 per year, requested by Japan, would not effect the stock's 
sustainability, or a quota of 50 in the North Pacific, nor would special status for small-type 
whalers, threaten the survival of those whale stocks. 
   Unfortunately for Japan, participants had to be convinced of the underlying premises of 
Japan's position to be convinced of Japan's "reasonableness." From the perspective of one 
branch of the environmental movement, Japan was the leading advocate of "sustainability." 
Sustainability, its supporters claim, includes the right of human beings to exploit nature and 
nature's creatures, but draws the line on exploitation if the survival of a species is threatened. 
In espousing sustainability,77 Japan's representatives couldn't see why they were under 
vehement attack After all, one of the most important problems of the late 20th century is 
finding mechanisms acceptable to most if not all states that will prevent the overexploitation 
of resources in global commons such as the ocean.78 This is a position that should be 
applauded by environmentalists, not derided. But while some environmentalists recognize the 
importance of solving the problem of exploitation of common property resources, there has 
been a shift in values in many developed states. For some opponents of exploiting living 
resources, the whale is a special, intelligent creature that should be exempt from human 
predation. For others, they care not about human standards, but support every effort to save 
every living creature from human exploitation whatever the consequence to humankind. To 
them, there is a reason for their unreasonableness. The new "ethic" has created a formidable 
opponent, as we shall see below. 
   Could a mutually acceptable solution, or one in which both sides could be made better 
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off, be worked out between these opposing positions? It was a bargaining situation in that it 
was a dynamic or moving event with parties, values, outcomes, and movement .79 
Consequently, difficult as the situation was for Japan, it required a bargaining stance. Japan 
did not adopt a bargaining stance. Japan's reservation price - the minimum she would find 
acceptable - and her maximum preferred position seem virtually indistinguishable.80 Though 
Japan has been involved in this negotiation every year in modern times, there are no obvious 
signs it has thought seriously about its best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA).81 
Japan's position is a problem-solving approach. A problem exists. Barriers to solving the 
problems are identified, and solutions worked out. At the final stage all that needs be done is 
implement the correct solutions. Japan's stance is very close to a "Boulware" strategy: begin 
with what you deem a fair opening offer and hold firm .82 
 2. Persistence as a Strategy 
   Japan's general bargaining position in the IWC was to hold firm on demands, show 
patience as detailed issues were worked out, and expect to outlast the opposition by sheer 
persistence. This was aided by the size of Japan's delegation - usually over 50 - and the 
continuity of leadership. Kazuo Shima has headed the Japanese delegation since 1987. If 
Japan kept at the effort to get the imperfections of the management regime cured, surely when 
all delegates saw that the management system was technically perfected, they would see that 
Japanese whaling would not be a danger to the sustainability of the whale stocks, and they 
would eventually accede to Japan's request to restore whaling rights. Discipline and fortitude 
were needed. Others must be persuaded of the correctness of Japan's position, or outlasted.83 
   Others have noted a tendency among Japanese negotiators to value commitment and 
resolve (ketsui) and to believe that if Japan shows resolve, opposing negotiators will take 
their demands seriously.84 This tendency was evident in the behavior of the Japanese 
delegation. A will to win was clearly shown. This reinforced and was intertwined with the 
belief in the substantive correctness of their position. Surely, if they showed patience, others 
would see that Japan was not making extravagant demands, that Japan's position represented 
a reasonable solution to the problem. 
   Some say that in negotiations Americans are impatient and too quick to make 
unnecessary concessions in order to conclude a negotiation expeditiously. But although many 
of the representatives of the NGOs that harassed Japan in the IWC were American, they and 
their allies in developed-state delegations were a different breed than "normal" developed 
state negotiators. They were committed to a new "ethic," their sense of commitment quasi-
religious. From their perspective, they were morally correct and they were not going to 
compromise, and certainly not concede to the idea that any whaling, much less full-scale 
whaling, might resume. But since their behavior was at times so extreme, it is hard to believe 
that Japanese delegates took them seriously however vociferous their participation. Surely, 
governments of the major states would see that their delegates had been led astray by people 
who represented fringe elements of their societies. They must eventually come to their senses 
and reverse "irrational decisions."85 
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   Underestimating an opponent is a major error. The anti-whaling forces have captured 
major state delegations, and that is not likely to change. They are very, very persistent. In 
addition to being certain that they control the outcome on major issues, they constantly 
attempt to widen the agenda of the Commission. The tactical effect is to create many fronts on 
which a state like Japan must fight. They raise new issues all the time, such as bringing small 
cetaceans such as porpoises under the jurisdiction of the Commission. Small cetaceans are not 
mentioned in the 1946 List of Nomenclature but, as the U.S. delegate put it, the IWC should 
now "broaden the debate to all cetaceans subject to commercial operations."86 They demand 
new information on scientific work, more studies, detailed reports on whale strandings, 
examinations of the records of the hunts of indigenous people, etc. They insist that the 
situation be re-reviewed in the light of new threats such as global change. They demand that 
states report information normally considered matters of domestic jurisdiction.87 In short, they 
keep their opponents busy answering queries and defending themselves against charges of 
sloppy technical work or moral insensitivity. 
 3. Passivity 
   The concomitant behavioral pattern associated with a "tough-it-out" strategy is seeming 
passivity. Japan rarely initiated new proposals, new or different ideas or activities in the IWC. 
It was not until the 46th session that Japan's delegates mounted any counterattack. Even then, 
when Japan tried to propose a new initiative, it was in an area where the delegates felt 
comfortable - research to promote conservation of large baleen whales in the Southern 
Ocean.88 
   Japanese delegates rarely strongly criticized the proposals of others or issued threats or 
warnings. As discussed above, when the Japanese were put on the defensive by the activist 
majority, their defense was stolid and not creative. The task was difficult and circumstances 
adverse, but one might have put forth new proposals which might repackage a basic position 
in a different way to require response from an opponent. Diversionary tactics are also useful. 
But ultimately, if Japan is to escape from the IWC with something of value, it must make 
proposals that are attempts at compromise or that, as Lax and Sebenius phrased it, "create 
value."89 If not, Japan must depend upon others to rescue it (a hope for amae?).90 To be 
effective, Japan must also respond positively to critics with plans or proposals that indicate 
that it takes seriously the concerns of opponents, "has considered the structure of the other 
sides's values and opportunities..."91. For example, many environmentalists worry that if a 
commercial market continues to exist for whale products, it will be impossible to prevent 
unauthorized or illegal whaling. If Japan's demands for restoration of commercial whaling are 
to be seriously entertained, Japan must show that it will vigorously participate in all efforts to 
end illegal whaling. This is but one of many substantive avenues that have been left 
unexplored. 
   Could a more creative attempt to "create value" have succeeded? Passivity only seemed 
to incite further attacks. It created a belief that Japan was intransigent and unyielding; that 
Japan wanted to restore unrestricted whaling at any price; that others must always be suspicious 
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of Japan's motives; that Japan is supporting an immoral activity. These beliefs may border on 
racism and anti-Japanese feelings, and some of them go over the border into outright racism. 
In turn, Japanese participants and observers feel that their motives and behaviors are 
misunderstood, and that there is a war of "meat"-based cultures against a "fish" culture. These 
feelings have poisoned the atmosphere.92 One key element needed for a positive sum outcome 
is trust. It is in very short supply in the IWC, making it problematic as to whether there can 
be a positive-sum outcome, instead of an imposed outcome. 
   Japan seemed always to be waiting for the other shoe to drop or preparing to fight off the 
next assault in an environment where the other shoe will drop and, if Japan does not 
surrender, the next assault, whether petty and harassing or more critical and strategic, will 
occur. 
 4. Go It Alone 
   Over the years of IWC meetings, Japan rarely sought allies. Until the 46th meeting, 
Japan essentially tried to achieve its aims alone. IWC meetings are a multilateral bargaining 
arena, and those who try to go it alone put themselves at a grave disadvantage. The structure 
of the situation calls for coalitional behavior. If there are three parties to a bargaining 
situation, the possibility of two-against-one always exists. Consequently any proponent of a 
position should always seek collaborators. 
   Japan was slow in seeking like-minded friends, and consequently has been isolated in the 
IWC. Some of this is a natural concomitant of her substantive interests. Japan is the only 
state currently seeking to whale legally in the Southern Ocean, and therefore has no natural 
allies on this issue. But on questions of the right of a state to engage in whaling in its own 
geographic region as long as the stocks are not threatened, and the right of its highly 
dependent artisanal whalers to continue to whale to maintain their lifestyle and their values, 
allies were available. To be sure, they were mostly small, economically weak states, but an 
effective coalition built among them could have forced the opponents of whaling to pay a 
higher price in seeking to find common value. In fact, when there was a hint in the Japanese 
press that Japan might have tied economic aid to Caribbean states to supporting Japan's 
positions in the IWC, anti-whaling forces protested vigorously.93 
   Japan began actively to seek out allies only in the 46th session. By that time a 
bandwagon effect had occurred, and its enemies had built a solid coalition in opposition.94 A 
and B agreed, and brought over C who also agreed, and D who did not want to be left off of 
the winning side joined up. A or B also were owed some favors by E, so E cooperated, and so 
on. In a sequence of actions over the 1980s and 1990s the anti-whaling coalition, calling 
themselves the "like-minded group" put Japan in a position where bargaining alternatives 
were limited and choices painful. 
  5. Legalism 
    In arguing its case, Japan relied heavily upon the notion that it was legally correct. But 
Japan missed the major point - the IWC is not a court but a negotiating arena. Even if 
Japan's interpretation of the ICRW is legally correct, it is at best a useful bargaining point to 
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use in debate, not an anchor for a bargaining strategy. 
   Japanese delegates argue that actions in recent years have turned the rules of the whaling 
regime on their head and are illegal: the majority has illegally transformed the IWC into 
something that violates the explicit language of the 1946 agreement. In particular, the ICRW 
preamble calls for members to help preserve whale stocks so that "sustain(ed) exploitation" 
should be possible. The IWC was established as a conservation organization. Its basic 
mandate is predicated on controlled consumption, not total preservation of whales. Moreover, 
"proper conservation of whale stocks ...[should]...make possible the orderly development of 
the whaling industry."95 The heart of the IWC's work should be amending the schedule. But in 
recent years, amendments have been blocked. The organization has taken action via 
resolutions which can be made under Article VI. But these are mere "recommendations," 
without binding force. Yet, the U.S. through domestic actions attempts to give them binding 
force, and for all practical purposes they have binding force. 
   These are powerful arguments (and if Japanese lawyers were arguing these points before 
an international equivalent of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, Japan's position 
might be sustained). Assuming that the founders' original intent forever freezes the notion of 
permissable behavior, then Japan's position would be seen as correct. The majority argues 
that they act in the spirit of the original agreement, but that no original agreement can 
account for changing circumstances, and that what they are doing falls under the notion of 
"progressive development ." They are merely updating the actions of the organization to deal 
with the problems of the times. There is nothing in the ICRW or, for example, Agenda 21 that 
prohibits setting a stricter standard.96 Naturally, in the process of "updating" the agreement, 
the majority has substantially expanded the mandate of the organization. 
   Though there is no international equivilent of a Justice Scalia, Japan could take the issue 
to an international tribunal. The final outcome might be no better than Mexico's fate when 
she brought the tuna controversy to a GATT panel, won, and then was forced to suspend any 
further action in order not to get the issue brought into the NAFTA debate. The diplomatic 
and economic weight of the United States prevailed. 
   Japan's emphasis on legal rights in the negotiation indicates that Japanese delegates felt 
deprived of substantive and procedural justice,97 and felt a sense of outrage. But keeping 
resentments boiling rather than looking for creative ways out of their dilemma probably will 
not help. Would acting more appropriately in multilateral bargaining before the situation got 
so bad have avoided the worst case? Japan's low state came about, at least partially, because 
of inadequate tactics. 
  6. Tactical Poverty 
   Some blame extenuating circumstances for Japan's IWC delegation failure to come up 
with creative tactics. Substantial numbers of Japanese delegates have scientific backgrounds, 
and such behavior is alien to their positivist instincts and training. But most other delegations 
are also staffed largely by persons with a scientific background, and they have become 
competent "political" scientists who can maneuver very effectively in a multilateral arena. 
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This cannot be the explanation of why Japan did so poorly in IWC negotiations. 
   Clearly many of the actions a delegation must take to function successfully in a 
multilateral setting were distasteful to the Japanese delegation. For the most part, they shied 
away from the rough and tumble of operating in an arena where tactics do matter, where the 
logic of one's position will not automatically persuade. I am not a specialist in Japanese 
political behavior. I cannot explain why this is so, but merely note that from observation, it is 
so. However, others have commented on the Japanese propensity for risk minimization and 
conflict avoidance.98 
   The paragraphs above discussed effective tactics which Japan's delegates did not use 
until they had been defeated on virtually all issues they cared about. The Japanese did not 
participate vigorously in debate to defend their own positions and attack others. Japan did not 
attempt to join, much less lead, a group of "like-minded" states that could have extracted a 
price for its cooperation. Japan did not try to manipulate the rules of procedure to its benefit 
but had to respond to the manipulations of others. Japan almost always reacted, almost never 
anticipated. Japan was always scrupulous in not leaking information to the press before 
providing it officially to IWC members.99 While Japan did meet with possible friends before 
the 46th session to map strategy and tactics, the efforts were so tentative that it did not 
provide effective leadership for the attempt to establish a workable coalition. Japan did not 
wish to appear to justify its opponents' specious claim that it was "buying" votes from the 
poor and weak. In most recent sessions of the Commission, Japan was not vigorous in making 
friendly amendments to documents of "like-minded" states and hostile amendments to 
documents submitted by opposing states until it tried to get minke whales exempted from the 
Southern Ocean Sanctuary. 
    There is no record of Japan encouraging a contact or compromise group meeting at or 
between IWC sessions, or seeking an "honest broker." If Japan thought that the United States 
would play the role of honest broker, it was sadly mistaken. Indeed, Japan gave opponents a 
significant advantage by routinely seeking advice from the United States on its IWC draft 
proposals months before an IWC session. The information provided ensured several months of 
counterpreparation and coordination for Japan's opponents in the IWC. 
   As of this writing, there is no indication that Japan has considered developing a package 
which includes a tradeoff. In such a tradeoff, typically a party to a negotiation indicates 
willingness to accept a less satisfactory outcome on an issue of lesser importance, or salience, 
for a more satisfactory outcome on an issue of greater salience. But this requires that within 
the country, government, and delegation there must be agreement on what is of greater and 
lesser salience. I doubt Japan has made such a determination. At a certain point in the history 
of a negotiation, the calculation of salience is influenced more by the notion of what can be 
saved rather than its intrinsic value. As shown earlier, Japan has no allies on Southern Ocean 
whaling, but should have on regional and small-scale whaling. Will Japan sacrifice the former 
for the latter? Is it ready to salvage what it can, or continue to defend all at the risk of overall 
failure? 
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   Finally, the behavior of Japan's delegation does not indicate that there was a good 
general understanding of international negotiations or its subset, multilateral negotiations. loo 
As I. William Zartman has shown, the typical international negotiation goes through 
identifiable phases. During the early or diagnostic phase, it becomes evident how the 
participants are framing the issue. What is being sought is a "formula" or "common definition 
of the conflict in terms amenable to a solution."lol In a bilateral negotiation, that common 
definition must be shared by both parties or defection will result. In a multilateral negotiation, 
unanimity is desirable, but may not be essential. Decision can come about if the decision 
rules allow for some form of majority rule. In the early 1990s the end of commercial whaling 
was the formula notion around which a majority was forming. While defection was still 
possible (it was a true negotiation), the opportunities available to those delegations in a small 
minority were not overturning the formula of the large majority, but mitigating it, or perhaps 
undermining it. The final phase of a typical international negotiation requires a refinement of 
the details. During this phase, a clever "loser" can do many things to help its situation. That 
is where we are today. Is Japan prepared to do this? 
IV. Fitting Observations to Theories 
   None of the three theoretical approaches - rational choice, a special culturally derived 
"Japanese Way," or the constraints under which Japanese delegates operates provides by 
itself a satisfactory explanation of Japan's bargaining behavior in the IWC. However, each of 
the three do provide partial explanations. Each needs one or more elements of the other 
approaches to enhance its ability to explain the outcome. As a result, our argument is circular 
and indeterminate.lo2 
A. Rational Decision-making 
   If what is sought and the relationship of one's interests to what is sought is the core of 
rational decision, then a rational approach can illuminate a portion of Japan's behavior.'03 
Japanese delegates clearly understood that their purpose was to advance Japan's interests. 
More abstractly, they "would prefer more primary goods than less. 11104 Japan's delegates 
certainly exercised a rational choice in terms of the ends pursued. They, like virtually all 
other decision-makers, exhibited bounded or limited rationality: They did not necessarily 
consider all their options, nor did they pursue their ends sequentially, and did not consider all 
of the consequences of their alternatives, but under the now widely accepted conditions of 
bounded rationality, they were rational. 105 However, it is questionable whether Japanese 
delegates were rational in the means they chose to pursue their ends. 106 107 
   In an effort to understand the problems of developing a positive-sum outcome in the IWC, 
I conducted an experiment using a decision-analytic technique called Multi-Attribute Utility 
Technology (MAUT). Instead of trying to capture all of the ongoing political activity in the 
organization, I assumed that the members had become serious about a thorough reform of the 
organization and were willing to engage in a constitutional type of negotiation to form a 
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"new" IWC. This allowed me to model the potential behavior of participating states over some 
key issues - both substantive and procedural - in the IWC debates. 
   To perform a MAUT it is necessary to (1) identify the objectives of decisions and the 
functions decision is intended to perform; (2) identify the stakeholders; (3) elicit value 
dimensions or attributes from stakeholders; (4) assess the relative importance of each value as 
found in the previous step; (5) ascertain single-attribute utilities or payoffs; (6) aggregate the 
payoffs with measures of importance; and (7) perform a sensitivity analysis.los 
   I tested Japan and several other states as stakeholders. For each, their value dimensions 
were elicited on the issues at hand (and not all of their values in the abstract). A partial list of 
these included contribution of whaling to GNP, contribution of whaling to local or regional 
economies, moral values, ecosystem concerns, aboriginal rights, management costs, national 
jurisdiction concerns, international obligation, and leadership. The other side of the matrix 
was composed of the substantive and procedural issues, such as a new constitutional 
statement of IWC purpose, principle of sustainability, entry control measures, geographic 
jurisdiction, special rights for small-type coastal whalers and aboriginal peoples, killing rules, 
enforcement measures, scientific whaling, as well as membership rules, voting rules, op-out 
provisions, and others. I wrote three scenarios to test possible national approaches. The first 
was a nonconsumption regime; the second a limited coastal consumption regime; and the third 
a restored but controlled pelagic whaling regime. 
   In the classic use of such models, an analyst usually attempts to elicit the values of the 
actual decision-makers. I had no resources to do so and I doubt if many delegations would 
have allowed it. Instead, as a second best, I used American students to "place sit" or stand in 
for the real-world decision-makers. 
   The experiment worked well and provided answers that seemed intuitively correct, 
including for Japan. This gave me confidence that in terms of substantive rationality, 
Japanese negotiators were rational. My students playing Japanese decision-makers not only 
chose the outcomes that could be expected of Japanese decision-makers, but reflected 
Japanese utilities (or payoffs) in a fashion that was convincing: a pelagic whaling regime was 
worth substantially more than a coastal whaling regime, and a nonconsumptive regime was 
almost valueless. 
   The model provided a good test of rationality concerning ends, but not for the process of 
matching means to ends. Because the model tried to take account of values, it captured well 
the Japanese delegation's sense of outrage. It predicted a strong response, but it did not help 
explain why Japan clung so tenaciously to the position it had espoused consistently on 
whaling since the moratorium - the complete restoration of Japan's right to whale for 
abundant species in local waters, the North Pacific, and the Southern Ocean as long as its 
takings were sustainable. The external costs were high, and delegation members were aware of 
these costs. However, to explain the behavior of pursuing rational ends by ineffective means, 
we must seek answers elsewhere. It seems likely that the delegation leaders believed that the 
internal costs would have been higher if they had chosen to pursue any other course of action 
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than sheer persistence. After all, persistence is the "Japanese way." Moreover, while there 
were few forces in Japanese domestic politics who found positive value in a compromise that 
might result in a partial restoration or surrender of Japan's whaling rights, there were plenty 
of forces with strong bureaucratic allies who wished to prevent the whaling problem from 
getting out of hand and creating problems on issues they really cared about. Continuing to 
persist was the best tactical response to the inputs of both cultural values and domestic 
constraints, and it is also rational in that, as the delegation saw it, they attempted to advance 
Japan's interests. Thus the logic of my argument is circular. 
B. A "Japanese Way" or Culture As The Key Explanatory Variable 
   I believe Japan's behavior is distinctive, that patterns could be seen. But that does not 
mean that I have discovered the wellspring of Japanese behavior.109 Have those patterns been 
caused by "set codes that are culturally determined"?"0 And, if they are culturally determined, 
are Japanese negotiators fated to repeat those patterns over and over again? 
   On the first question, since my observations were similar to other scholars', especially 
Blaker's, I believe that an important explanation of Japanese bargaining behavior on the 
whaling issue is found in culture. But what are the attributes of the culture that are causally 
related to particular patterns discerned? Being only marginally acquainted with the literature 
on Japanese behavior, I leave it to specialists to comment on whether what I observed was 
"typically" Japanese and to explain what in Japanese culture conditioned its representati ves 
to act as they did. 
   Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of instrumental rationality, whatever "caused" Japanese 
bargaining efforts in the IWC, a good portion of it was dysfunctional. It harmed rather than 
helped create a higher probability of some degree of success in meeting Japan's objectives 
and finding a positive-sum outcome. But must Japan go on repeating such behavior? 
Bargaining is a process that involves learning, which involves adaptation. Japan has been 
successful in adapting in many other realms, including other ocean negotiations. Japan also 
lost in its vehement defense of a Grotian worldview in the early portions of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of ther Sea and adapted well."' Japanese negotiators can 
improve their success rate if they examine their actions with an open mind and not mistrust 
"countercultural learning because it goes against the grain." 2 
   Before leaving the question of culture, I should mention that some interested partiesl13 
may consider my observation about Japanese "dysfunctional" bargaining behavior too broadly 
drawn. One could argue that indeed, Japan's delegation did respond strongly on this issue and 
in a particularly Japanese manner, but that whaling is such an atypical case that one should 
not use it to generalize on overall Japanese bargaining behavior. I did not perform a 
comparative analysis, so I cannot make claim that the patterns I observed were typical. 
C. Constraints 
   Japanese negotiators in the IWC were, I believe, constrained in their range of tactical 
options by the instructions they received. Of course, all diplomats, except in very ad hoc 
situations, have instructions they must obey. But the substance of the constraints and the 
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manner in which they will effect bargaining outcomes differ from state to state. In Japan's 
case, instead of culture molding outcome, one might argue that structure molds outcome so 
that, for example, the slow pace of Japanese decision-making is not an artifact of the culture 
but of a bureaucratically dominated political system. 114 This is one of the systemic structural 
features of Japan that could explain why Japan behaved as she did in the IWC. The 
instructions were written within a bureaucratically dominated system with a close alliance 
between the bureaucracy, big business, and the ruling political party. It was run until recently 
by a conservative coalition. It is characterized by state-run capitalism with an important role 
for the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and an over-representation of 
rural areas and small towns in the Diet. It is a consensus-based system that pays a high 
transaction cost for reaching agreement. Consequently, it makes decisions slowly, and they 
are hard to change. This is probably too sweeping a set of generalizations (perhaps even a 
caricature, especially in the light of increasing pluralism115), but if one posits constraints as 
the principle causal factor, these attributes could explain the deep causes of Japan's tactical 
failure in the IWC. 
   I believe there is merit to this approach.116 I hope this report can be the basis of further 
work by a scholar with the skills and resources to read the Japanese press in depth, assess 
Japanese public opinion, interview senior officials in the relevant bureaucratic agencies, and 
look at leadership patterns on the issue. I must rely upon acquaintance with participants in 
IWC matters; Japanese and American ocean officials, and social-science theory. My evidence 
is anecdotal. Most is related directly to the Japanese delegation or the bureaucracies it deals 
with so it is long on information about these organizations and short on public opinion, Diet 
politics and interest groups. It is therefore difficult to demonstrate the usefulness of the two-
level game approach to the problem. 
   There are some signs of increasing Japanese pluralism on the whaling issue - the growth 
of anti-whaling environmental groups in Japan, the increase in the economic value of whale-
watching.117 But there seems to be very little dissent concerning the goals of Japanese 
bargaining in the IWC. Restorating Japan's right to whale, albeit under controlled conditions, 
was desired by the public and leaders of most major institutions. In other words, there were 
few cross-cutting cleavages in Japanese society that would have made it difficult for 
delegation members to present the strongest case for restorating commercial and small-type 
whaling.118 There was dissensus, according to insiders, on the question of how far Japan 
should go tactically and how Japan's position on whaling might effect the interests of other 
groups in the political system and their bureaucratic sponsors. 
   One key issue is best explained by the constraint argument is why Japan has stayed in 
the negotiations, even under the most adverse circumstances. It is difficult to conceive of any 
worse outcome than has been achieved thus far. Moreover, there is a prospect that matters 
could get worse. But the delegation did not take stronger action - probably because it could 
not. 
   The Japanese delegation to the IWC was headed by Kazuo Shima. He is an experienced 
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and articulate bureaucrat and negotiator who has headed the delegation for seven years. 
Having been the focus of the anger and unseemly behavior of anti-whaling groups, he has a 
personal incentive for Japan to take stronger measures, and perhaps even withdraw from the 
IWC. But his agency has to worry about precedents being set in the IWC. There are already 
rumors that any new constraints on whaling Japan might be forced to accept might also be 
applied to other marine hunting (fishing) activities, in particular, tuna fishing.119 
   While a Fisheries Agency bureaucrat heads the delegation, it is staffed by bureaucrats 
from other agencies. Many delegates were drawn from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOF), 
which has a strong interest in seeing that the IWC negotiation does not get out of control and 
impinge upon other issues of importance to Japan. Anecdotal evidence also points to the 
strong if hidden hand of MITI. Their interest also was to see that whaling did not get 
entangled with ongoing trade negotiations that Japan has been conducting with the United 
States and others. Since whaling is an infinitesimal contributor to Japan's GNP, and there are 
substitutes for whale-derived protein, MITI wanted to be very sure that a U.S. trade sanction 
was not invoked, since it might lead to a round of retaliations. Matters could unravel very 
quickly if that were to happen and a trade war between the United States and Japan might 
result. 
   Since there was a consensus that Japan's goals were worthy goals but no consensus on 
how to achieve or what was the appropriate price to pay to reach those goals, Japan's 
delegates were forced to stay in the negotiation to the bitter end. Although the outcome was 
predictable several years ago, no action was taken to prevent the worst from happening. Japan 
is now faced with deciding whether it can continue to whale under IWC auspices, or at all. 
However difficult it will be to form a new consensus within Japanese society and government 
re whaling, it is now imperative. 
   Japan has three options - withdraw, surrender, or continue to negotiate. If it chooses the 
first, Japan could proclaim its adherence to "sustainability" as a rival principle to 
"nonconsumption ," withdraw from the IWC, and seek allies to establish a rival organization(s) 
to give its legal claims legitimacy. This judgment might be based upon an assessment of the 
fact that the rules of the game are stacked against it, that it could no longer adapt to this 
framework, and it could not manipulate the system to its advantage. 120 But if the price of 
defection is judged to be too high, Japan could exercise Ikle's other option - openly 
surrender and find substitutes for whale meat. This course would create heavy cultural and 
psychological, but trivial material, costs. 
   On the other hand, if one believes that Japan is most likely to behave in ways that 
respond to cultural and structural mediation of their rational choice set, there is another 
scenario for the future of Japan's relationship to the IWC. Japan could remain a member, 
make demands for the restoration of whaling rights, claim adherence to the sustainability 
principle, convince itself that with persistence some day the majority will come to their 
senses, continue to take a small number of whales under the right to conduct scientific 
whaling but not otherwise "cheat" on the moratorium, and never admit defeat. In this way, 
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Japan could avoid openly exercising a choice that is painful for the individual decision-
makers and dangerous to entrenched interests. If Japan chooses this course, two opposing 
outcomes might result - implicit surrender if opponents do not accommodate its interests, or 
victory if the assumption that its will is stronger proves correct. Because this scenario is 
based on the way I view Japan's substantive rationality heavily influenced by culture and 
structure, my guess is that this will be Japan's preferred course of action. 
   If Japan decides to "tough it out" or "stay the course," unless the new Republican 
majority in the 104th U.S. Congress forces changes in US whaling policy, Japan can expect 
more of the same - delay, delay, delay. Action will shift to working out details of a 
compliance scheme under the RMP. A perfected scheme will be a prerequisite for restorating 
commercial whaling.121 Once again the world probably will watch guerrilla theater instead of 
a demonstration of how an important international institution helps resolve a resource 
problem of consequence to the planet's future.
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